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A SUGGESTED FAMILY COURT
SYSTEM FOR CALIFORNIAt
Aidan R. Gough*
During the period from July 1st, 1961, through June 30th,
1962, 89,212 actions for divorce, separate maintenance and an-
nulment were filed in California.' Roughly speaking, since 1960,
for every four marriages in California there has been one divorce
-and some areas of California run higher than this.2 In 1960, in
Sacramento County, for example, there was more than one divorce
for each three marriages, and in Napa County three divorces for
every four marriages.' To be sure, these figures must be viewed
in the light of California's population explosion and myriad other
societal factors. The fact remains that the problems are there, and
they cry out for solution-or at least understanding and alleviation.
The need for intensive cross-disciplinary study of these problems is
apparent.' It is the purpose of this paper to suggest a point of
inquiry for such study.
As the number of marital severance actions mounts, so does
the concern over the reflected disorganization of more and more
families. Increasingly, there is felt a need to have the law take steps
to ameliorate the problems raised by family dissolution. We have
seen, in recent years in California, an increased use of the court
t This article is based upon a memorandum of testimony submitted by the
author, representing The State Bar of California as a member of its Committee
on Family Law, before The Assembly Interim Committee on the Judiciary at
hearings in January, 1964. The views expressed herein are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect those of The State Bar of California or the University
of Santa Clara.
* A.B., 1956, M.A., 1957, Stanford University; LL.B., 1962, University of
Santa Clara; Member, California Bar. Assistant Professor, School of Law, University
of Santa Clara.
1 Report of the Judicial Council of California, 1962, quoted in Transcript of
Hearings on Domestic Relations Law Before the Assembly Interim Committee on
the Judiciary 278 (1964).
2 Transcript of Hearings on Domestic Relations Law Before the Assembly
Interim Committee on the Judiciary 280 (1964).
3 Id. at 281.
4 Really, we know appallingly little about the "real picture" behind the figures
we too often blithely cite. For example, how many of the divorces cited involved
under-age marriages? How long had the parties been married? Is there any signifi-
cant difference in dissolution rate between marriages contracted in California and
those entered into elsewhere? What study there has been of these trends and
patterns of marital behavior has been too often fragmentary and isolated to a
particular discipline or field.
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of conciliation, both in Los Angeles County and elsewhere, and
we have seen the development of community resource agencies de-
signed to provide assistance to families in distress.5 These efforts
are laudable. They are also, however, vastly insufficient. In many
ways, the legal system of adversary procedure within which they
operate negates their efficacy.
When we speak of "reconciliation" in terms of this adversary
process, we speak, it seems to me, of opposites. We go "to a goat's
house for wool." Nothing would appear more effectively designed
to preclude resolution of marital problems than a procedure which,
at the outset, pits the parties one against another, angers opposing
spouses, and may well force a spouse into a position (i.e., of seeking
permanent marital dissolution) he or she did not really wish to
take. It is not enough, however, merely to point out the defects
in the existing system. There must be provided a constructive
framework within which the efforts of the court and the com-
munity can be effective. To that end these suggestions are offered.
ESTABLISHMENT OF A FAMILY COURT
The ideal of the Family Court is that of a court designed to
bring every possible resource to bear upon the family problems
before it and thus to prevent the ultimate problem: family break-
up.6 To be effective as such, it must be an "integrated" court-
i.e., in terms of California, a single autonomous family division
in the superior court with jurisdiction over all cases dealing with
family life and its difficulties. These would include cases of adop-
tion, paternity, civil and criminal nonsupport, child neglect and
dependency, delinquency, child custody, and guardianship (of the
person, at least) of minors.
In addition to having integrated jurisdiction over family
cases, the Family Court would adopt a conference or non-adver-
sary prqcedure, save in those cases where a spouse demanded an
adversary hearing for the finding of disputed fact.7 The investi-
gative staff of the Family Court would examine the cases referred
5 See, e.g., Burke, The Role of Conciliation in Divorce Cases, J. OF FAMILY
LAW 209 (1961); ABA SECTION OF FAMILY LAW, PROCEEDINGS 211 et seq. (1962).
6 Alexander, Legal Science and the Social Sciences: The Family Court, 21 Mo.
L. REv. 105 (1956).
7 On the retention of adversary process in such cases, see Huard, Memorandum
of Testimony at Hearings on S. 2701 Before the Committee on the District of
Columbia of the United States, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 et seq. (1954). Some have
suggested provisions for jury trials of matrimonial issues within the Family Court;
see GELLHORN ET AL., CHILDREN AND FAMILIS IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY
12 (1954).
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to it to determine the possibilities for reconciliation, and under-
take to exploit them; it could also provide information leading
to surer and more amicable settlement of family problems other
than divorce.8
In addition to the benefits of the non-adversary proceeding,
the Family Court system would provide immediate practical bene-
fit in other areas, by eliminating much of the duplicated effort and
congestion of calendars which characterizes our present process.
Consider the following hypothetical case-which would by no
means be atypical:
After some months of increasing family friction and discord, the
wife obtains an interlocutory decree of divorce, and is given custody
of the minor child, a boy aged 11. Upset by the discord between
his parents, the boy develops more and more problems at school,
and finally refuses to attend at all. He is then referred to the juvenile
court as a truant, and is made a ward of the juvenile court. After
the final decree, the father petitions the court for appointment as
guardian of the minor's estate, feeling that the mother is incapable
of sound business management. Shortly thereafter, the mother remar-
ries, and her second husband wishes to adopt the boy through a step-
parent adoption. After some time, mother and her second husband
seek to adopt another child.
Involved in this case are five separate divisions of the superior
court, and at least as many ancillary agencies.' The reports of
one are not readily available to another; much testimony is
repetitive; investigations are duplicated; calendars are clogged;
and parties as well as taxpayers are put to needless expense and
confusion. Since a marital severance proceeding frequently gen-
erates one or more such "collateral" actions, such as petitions
in juvenile court, attention should be given to the possibilities
of combining them within a single division of the court.
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO FILE FOR MARITAL SEVERANCE;
SUBSTITUTION OF PETITION FOR COMPLAINT;
TEMPORARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Under our present method of pleading in actions for disso-
lution of marriage or separate maintenance, the plaintiff files a
complaint charging his or her spouse with some form of marital
8 The use of specially trained investigating staff is essential to the proper
operation of the Family Court. It should not be the function of the staff to
investigate the existence of grounds of divorce, defenses, and the like.
) When the issue of the child's custody is first raised, the Court may order
a custody investigation by the probation officer under section 582 of the Cali-
fornia Welfare and Institutions Code (1963). (This may be done by domestic
relations investigators in counties having such a system.) At the hearing in Juvenile
[Vol. 4
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misconduct. It has been observed, in testimony before the United
States Congress concerning this type of procedure in marriage
cases, that "nothing could be more effectively designed to set the
parties at sword's point and preclude any possibility of a friendly
conciliation of their difficulties."'" In the proposed Family Court
system, the initial pleading would be a simple notice of intent
to file for divorce (or other form of marital severance). No
charges would be levied or grounds set forth. This notice of in-
tent would then be served in the usual manner upon the other
spouse, who would not be required to answer. The sole function of
this notice would be to bring the parties within the jurisdiction
of the court.
With such a notice, there could be provided a means of
temporary injunctive relief which would not force the parties into
a permanent adversary position. At present, before any temporary
relief pendente lite can be granted, there must be filed a com-
plaint for divorce, annulment or separate maintenance. There
would appear to be considerable need for some form of temporary
restraining order in which the moving party did not have to set
himself or herself out as seeking a divorce. In all too many cases
the wife, for example, may need a means of keeping the husband
away from the home and the children during a period of dis-
turbance, and yet not wish a divorce at all. Under existing law
the only way she can obtain such relief is to file for a divorce.
The adoption of the proposed procedure would allow not only
the granting of effective temporary relief without so drastic a
change of position, but would also bring the parties within the
jurisdiction of the court at a point in time when they might be
most susceptible to the assistance which could be provided by
the Family Court and a non-adversary process. By providing
for such notice of intent and some form of temporary relief,
grantable ex parte upon showing of sufficient urgency but made
quickly returnable, the court's resources could be more effectively
utilized toward resolution of the problems, rather than being fo-
cused on formal issues of law."
Upon the return of service of the notice of intent, at least in
those cases involving children, the matter would be assigned to a
Court, the probation officer will present another report. If it wishes, the Probate
Court may order an investigation (also under section 582) at the time of the
hearing of the guardianship petition. This will be a third report. The step-parent
adoption would be investigated by the juvenile probation officer, and finally the
"straight" adoption report would be prepared by the State Department of Social
Welfare.
10 Huard, op. cit. supra note 7, at 2.
11 Credit for this suggestion must be given its originator, James A. Wright,
Esq., President of the Santa Clara County Bar.
1964]
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domestic relations counselor on the court's staff, who would prepare
an initial report on the possibilities of conciliation. No conciliation
efforts would be undertaken without the consent of both parties,
and copies of the report would be furnished each party. If con-
ciliation were not achieved, there would be filed by the moving
party a petition for divorce or other form of marital severance.
This would set forth grounds for dissolution of the marriage, and
would be captioned "In re Marriage of Jones," rather than "Jones
v. Jones." This petition would be heard in a conference-type hear-
ing, conducted much as juvenile court hearings are presently
conducted, and would proceed in the spirit of mediation rather
than contest. If the other spouse desired to litigate disputed facts,
an answer to the petition could be filed, and the matter transferred
to the trial calendar to be heard in the usual way.
The adoption of a petition form of pleading would streamline
the procedure and be in keeping with the legal theory, long recog-
nized in this state as elsewhere, that there is a "status" or
"marital res" in which the state has an interest. 12
It may appear that this is a time-consuming process. It is
the author's belief that it is rightly so, so long as there is some
means of affording rapid injunctive relief. The lapse of time,
coupled with efforts at reconciliation conducted in a proper set-
ting, can provide a "cooling-off" period at a time when this can
be of greatest benefit. Under our present system, with the inter-
locutory period, we approach the problem backwards: When the
parties first appear in court, we tell them, in effect: "You're
severed; now you have one year within which to get back together."
If our goal is the resolution of marital problems, and conciliation,
this period of time should be provided before the decree severing
the marital bond is rendered. In effect, the interlocutory period
would be shortened, and placed between the time of filing of the
notice and the hearing on the petition.
It is my firm conviction that the adoption of a Family Court
Division, with non-adversary proceedings save for cases of dis-
puted fact, would not result in an "easier" divorce. Conversely,
it would give the attorneys, the court, and other agencies in-
volved a framework within which the effective resolution of
family problems could be carried out. It may be noted that the
changes suggested above, though major, are largely procedural
in nature."8 We already have in operation courts whose "juris-
12 See collection of cases in 3 WITKIN, SUM-MARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 8, at
2560, § 52, at 2601 (7th ed. 1960).
13 See Rubin, The Standard Family Court Act, 1 J. or FAMILY LAW 105
(1961).
[Vol. 4
FAMILY COURT SYSTEM
dictions" can be combined into an effective integrated whole. This
could be done without altering the board structure of the superior
court as it now exists, by creating within it the Family Court
Division. This system would not sacrifice the best elements of our
adversary process; would not displace the lawyer in his role as
advocate and counselor in legal matters, but would at the same
time allow greater use of skilled specialists in treatment of the
family's problems; and would not result in the abdication of the
safeguards of judicial control. Under such a system, the social
sciences and the law could be combined to produce maximum effort
toward preserving marriage and the family.
Obviously, the foregoing proposals do not pretend to be working
drawings. They are, rather, preliminary sketches, and they should
be construed as an invitation for criticism and suggestion. The
concept of the Family Court Division for California is not new.
In 1963, the Governor's Welfare Study Commission recommended
that study be undertaken to determine the feasibility of such a
system. In the words of the Commission, "The concept appears
to have much merit."'1 4 How much merit it may have, we cannot
know until we have tried it.
14 State of California, Final Report of Governor's Weljare Study Commission
77 (1963).
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